America: A Beacon, Not a Policeman       America: a Beacon, not a Policeman

Germany and France Diverging from America--towards Russia + Russia Foreign Policy Analysis

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      America's disastrous foreign policy of the last 8 years, run by Clinton, but designed and promoted by the WarParty, is separating the U.S. from Europe and pushing Europe and Russia together.  Both are fearful of the consequences of "cowboy" shoot-em-ups, go-it-alone confrontations, and a foreign policy fractured by Congressional grandstanding (the reason democracies can't run empires--see America is not Rome).  Added to this is growing hatred of America in the Arab, and major parts of the Moslem world, although camouflaged so far by kings and dictators who keep its manifestations suppressed.  In particular is German Russian "raprochement." And now French too (see below)

    Below are reports and analyses by Stratfor.com, an excellent internet based intelligence service.  Subscriptions are inexpensive and highly worth taking.--

Diverging Approaches Toward Russia Straining U.S.-European Relations
0150 GMT, 010127

Summary

The Council of Europe voted to restore Russia’s voting rights in the Parliamentary Assembly on Jan. 25. Hours before, Washington announced its disapproval of Russian actions in Chechnya. The Council of Europe, seen as a voice of moral authority in Europe, has demonstrated that Europe intends to engage Russia while the United States keeps Russia at arm’s length. These different approaches toward Russia could strain relations between Europe and the United States.

Analysis

The Council of Europe voted to restore Russia’s voting rights in the Parliamentary Assembly on Jan. 25. The Council had suspended Russia’s voting rights for nine months because of accusations of human rights violations by Russians in Chechnya. Hours before the Jan. 25 vote, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said there were credible reports of human rights violations by Russian troops, indicating that Washington disapproves of Russian action in Chechnya. The difference in U.S. and European attitudes toward Russia foreshadows a split in European-U.S. relations.

The Council of Europe, based in Strasbourg, France, concerns itself with human rights and emerging democracies. The Council comprises a Parliamentary Assembly and a Committee of Ministers. A largely powerless organization, it serves as a voice of moral authority but tends to mimic opinions of the European Union. The Council limits membership to countries that have a pluralistic democracy and a respect for the rule of law and human rights.

With a vote of 88 to 20, the Parliamentary Assembly restored Russia’s voting rights. The vote, coupled with the strongly worded press release calling for Russia to improve human rights in Chechnya, shows a general European desire to engage and work with Russia to solve common problems. As British Lord Judd said, the alternative was "to sit with our arms crossed and do nothing," according to Reuters. 

The United States may take a more hard-line approach regarding Russia. Washington’s stated disapproval of human rights violations by Russian troops in Chechnya and its desire to implement a National Missile Defense system, which Moscow vehemently opposes, are indicative of Washington’s more confrontational approach toward Russia.

Europe and the United States are showing diverging policies in their relationships with Russia. While the United States takes a more confrontational approach, Europe seeks cooperation. Although each European country differs in its policy toward Russia, the Council’s actions demonstrate that Europe has reached a consensus: engage Russia to solve common problems. This reflection of European policy will bring Europe into conflict with Washington in the areas of NATO expansion, the NMD shield and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans-debt restructuring.

While the United States supports NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, the rest of Europe is working with Russia to establish Euro Corps. This new European military force could compete with NATO.

As well, Europe sides with Russia in opposing Washington’s proposed NMD system. The United States intends to move forward with NMD, despite European and Russian objections, demonstrating Washington’s determination to act independently of European and Russian concerns.

In another example, the United States diverges from Europe on Russian debt to the Paris Club. Russia owes $48 billion to the Paris Club, of which only 4 billion is owed to the United States, reported Interfax on Jan. 12. Europe’s greater economic interest in Russia motivates it to assist Moscow’s efforts to restructure its debt. President Bush, however, has opposed new IMF loans to Russia and has called for Moscow to first address corruption and rebuild its economy. 

Europe faces a dilemma. It must decide between engaging Russia and bringing itself into conflict with the United States, or siding with the United States and aggravating a powerful neighbor who owes a lot of money. Relations between Europe and the United States will deteriorate as Washington pursues policies that spark confrontation and hostility, while Europe attempts to maintain peaceful and productive relations with Russia.

The Council of Europe’s vote foreshadows a future of strained U.S.-European relations. As Europe follows its own agenda independent of the United States, both will move apart. Russia will take advantage of the split where it can to improve its own situation.

 

 

 

 

 

Shifting Europe's Power Balance  

                        31 December 2000

THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATE - FULL TEXT FOR MEMBERS ONLY

Summary

Russia and Germany are considering converting a large chunk of
Russia's $14 billion debt to Germany into equity stakes in
Russian companies, which would make Germany a major shareholder
in Russian industry. The deal will represent an important move in
forging a close geopolitical partnership between Germany and
Russia. This may help Russia's revival, and Germany could emerge
as the leader of a united Europe with Russia on its side. Such a
development would significantly weaken U.S. influence in Europe
while dramatically strengthening Germany and Russia and helping
them to advance to the front stage of world geopolitics.

Analysis

Germany and Russia are forging an economic deal that, if it
succeeds, may shift the balance of European power. Werner Muller,
German economic minister, and German Gref, Russian minister of
economic development and trade, met in Berlin Dec. 12 to debate
details of a plan to exchange Russian debt for German equity in
Russian companies.

The two sides have agreed in principle to swap a large share of
Russia's $14 billion debt, The Times reported Dec. 13. One option
they are considering is giving to Germany a significantly larger
share in Gazprom, Russia's gigantic gas export monopoly.
Germany's Ruhrgas now holds 4 percent.

Obtaining several billion dollars worth of stakes in Russian
enterprises would make Germany a major shareholder in Russian
industry, giving Berlin a stronger voice in Moscow. In addition,
it would further tie Berlin's interests to economic and political
stability in Russia. Russia already supplies about 35 percent of
Germany's gas needs.

Moscow and Berlin understand this fast-growing mutual cooperation
will strengthen each country's potential and help advance both to
the front stage of world geopolitics. This most recent deal is
just one important move in this direction. Such moves have
significantly accelerated since President Vladimir Putin came to
power in Russia.

Several factors pull Russia and Germany closer. On the verge of
economic collapse, Russia has been bitterly disappointed with its
failed romance with the United States in the first post-communist
years, during which Moscow received no real help. It fears
Washington's single-superpower domination and Moscow's lack of
real geopolitical allies will contribute to precluding Russia
from restoring its world power status and possibly lead to the
end of the Russian state.

But Russia cannot afford a direct confrontation with the United
States in the near- or mid-term future. The only country that
could help Russia successfully confront the United States is
China. But with all the talk about the Russia-China geostrategic
partnership, Russia is concerned China's geopolitical designs may
include swallowing vast, underpopulated regions of weakened
Russia at some point in the future.

Being a part of European civilization and always yearning for
recognition in Europe, the majority of Russia's elite and the
current Russian government in particular have been reluctant to
turn east in their search for allies. They still see Europe as
the most desirable place to be.

Russia desperately needs large-scale foreign direct investments.
Even if they wanted to, neither Britain nor France - not to
mention the other European countries - would be able to shore up
Russia's economic and overall revival. As for the United States,
Moscow believes Washington will continue to insist Russia makes
one concession after another until it becomes fully subjugated to
the United States.

China and other non-Western nations cannot afford any large
investment in Russia: They themselves need it to come from
abroad. And Japan is reluctant to proceed until it resolves the
problem of the "northern territories" with Russia.

But Germany seems to be both able and willing to support Russia's
revival, while not demanding humiliating concessions. Berlin sees
a close partnership with Moscow as a future geopolitical benefit.

First, for its own further growth, Germany needs Russia's
enormous natural resources, the last in the world to remain
largely untapped. By giving Russia economic and political aid,
Germany makes sure these resources will flow to its territory
from a stable, German-friendly Russian government, such as that
of Vladimir Putin, who speaks German.

Second, a stable, Germany-backed Russia would provide the
cheapest, fastest and safest transportation corridor for shipping
goods and resources between Germany and the  rest of Europe and
the world's most dynamic economies in the Asia Pacific.

Third, Germany feels building a secure, united Europe would be
impossible if Russia were left without support, destabilized and
hostile. After experiencing a half-century Cold War, during which
the main front-line was right in the middle of Germany, Berlin
would hate to see the old times return. German strategists
realize a weakened and abandoned Moscow might feel threatened
enough to take on prosperous Europe as a desperate measure if it
senses Russia's final collapse. 

In a broader sense, Germany foresees Russia as guarding the outer
borders of a larger European community from Islamic radicals and
other growing external threats. For the same reasons, Germany
would be glad to see Russia's vast resources come to Germany and
Europe rather than to the east, particularly future geopolitical
rivals China and Japan. Berlin would also prefer these resources
do not move overseas to the United States, Germany's current
geopolitical rival.

Europe and the European Union - except for U.S.-oriented Great
Britain - seem to be solidly behind Germany in its Russian
policy. The difference is that Germany is pioneering and leading
this process, while aiming to benefit from it the most.

Forging a close geopolitical partnership between Germany and
Russia, if it is successful, will dramatically change the global
balance of power. Assisting in Russia's integration into Europe
would result in Germany's emergence as the leader of a united
Europe with Russia on its side. Such a development would
significantly weaken U.S. influence in Europe. On the other hand,
Chinese positions will be weakened as well, with Russia drifting
away from it and toward Germany and Europe.

copyright Stratfor.com, 2001, All Rights Reserved

(more)

SECRET NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING KALININGRAD'S FATE.

Russia has begun secret talks with Germany regarding the fate of Kaliningrad, in light of Moscow's recent offer to redeem its $22 billion debt to Germany through shares of Russian enterprises, according to the Daily Telegraph. During German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's visit to Moscow in the beginning of January, he discussed prospects for Germany’s gradual economic expansion into the Kaliningrad area with President Putin and Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, according to the newspaper. These plans might materialize as part of the
'debts-for-shares' deal that has already been dubbed the
'Schroeder-Kasyanov' plan, the Daily Telegraph noted.

by Victor J. Yasmann

Copyright (c) 2001, American Foreign Policy Council

And Now France too

                        S T R A T F O R . c o m

             THE INTERNET SOURCE FOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE

                        http://www.stratfor.com
___________________________________________________________________

                        13 February 2001

THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATE - FULL TEXT FOR MEMBERS ONLY

___________________________________________________________________

France-Russia: Growing Strategic Ties

Summary

French Defense Minister Alain Richard's recent visit to Moscow
confirms French efforts to forge closer ties with Russia. France
and Russia have formalized new strategic ties that are to involve
much deeper interaction between their military establishments.
Surprisingly, France may also gain military capabilities. For
Paris, closer military ties are mostly a matter of
counterbalancing Germany in European geopolitics.

Analysis

French Defense Minister Alain Richard's visit to Moscow on
Jan.17-18 formalized an extensive and intensive program of
strategic and military-technical collaboration. The defense
ministries agreed to hold top-level military exchanges, joint
military exercises, military education exchanges, and to increase
cooperation in the defense sector.

The French government is going to go significantly further than
any other Western country. Germany currently leads Europe in
large-scale political, security, economic, financial and
investment cooperation with Russia. The agreement between the
Russian and French defense ministries will allow France to catch
up with Germany in the military and military-technical fields.

Strategic ties between France and Russia are to involve much
deeper interaction between their militaries. The visits of their
chiefs of general staffs will focus on strategic consultations
where both military establishments will discuss enhancing their
national interests through geostrategic cooperation.

For France, closer strategic ties with Russia are important to
the balance of power in the region. Since the second half the
19th century, France has tried to deter Germany's might on the
continent by striking a strategic alliance with Russia. In two
world wars, the French and Russians fought together against the
Germans.

During the Cold War, Germany was the focus of NATO, while France
was relegated to a lesser role. Germany could not afford to toy
with Russia, which massed troops in the Eastern half of Germany.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Paris renewed its
apprehension at Berlin's influence.

Paris' ability to play an important role in Europe has plummeted
since the fall of the Soviet Union. Moreover, France lacks the
economic potential to compete with Germany over new European
markets.

Developing a partnership with Paris fits neatly with Russian
President Vladimir Putin's strategy to cozy up to Europe while
undermining NATO's role there. Moscow will also do its best to
penetrate the French and Western European arms market through
joint production and sales to help revive the Russian economy and
defense sector.

Germany is again on the frontier between a united Europe and a
diversified group of still unstable post-communist states,
including Russia. However, economic absorption of vast
territories east of Germany would enrich Berlin's potential,
while instability there poses security risks for Germany and
Europe.

So far, European economic and political cohesion has come from
cooperation between Germany and France. Already Berlin has been pushing Paris aside in controlling the euro and European fiscal policy. If Germany controls access to all new EU members and non-EU partners to the East, then it would magnify its influence economically, politically, and militarily.

Berlin will always be more important for Russia's security,
politics and economy than Paris. Still, Paris does what it can to
restore its importance in European geopolitics. Since it cannot
match German economic influence in Russia, Paris has looked
toward increased military ties with Moscow.

The most advanced area of French-Russian cooperation draws from military-technical collaboration. In addition to financial gains
from selling jointly modified Russian weapons to third countries,
France aims at getting new military capabilities through
mastering some Russian advanced weapons systems.

Further growth is expected in the number of joint projects and
the level of Russian-French collaboration in military-technical
field. According to Nezavisimaya-Gazeta on Jan. 17, several
projects are planned. Moscow and Paris attach special importance
to the following three:

First, the French army is keen on buying Russia's Krasnopol'
self-propelled artillery system. Its range is up to 40
kilometers, and Russia has worked on extending it to 60
kilometers. The French army wants to have this unique high-
precision system for extending its battlefield capabilities.
Also, Russia successfully combat-tested the Krasnopol' in
Chechnya last spring.

Second, France and Russia want to produce a new version of the
MiG-29 air superiority fighter for use as a trainer jet in the
French air force and for selling it to Central Europe and North
Africa - primarily Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Since it will
be a new version of the aircraft, it will complement rather than
compete with Germany's EADS partnership with MiG in modernizing
MiG-29 versions in those countries.

Third, French defense firms will supply avionics for 32 Russian
SU-30MKI multi-purpose fighters to sell to India. Israel is also
participating in the deal. Paris wants to work further with
Moscow on this by extending the contract and marketing new
customers.

While the French and Russian governments have similar views on
many important international issues, such as opposing American
National Missile Defense plans, they have some serious
disagreements on ways to resolve other problems, such as
Chechnya. Paris will never catch up with Berlin, but that won't
keep the French government from trying.

Copyright Stratfor.com.2001, All Rights Reserved

 

 

The National Post (Canada)

July 23, 2001

Behind Russia's Reconstruction

By George Jonas

Vladimir Putin's recent remarks, both at the G7-plus-Russia meeting at Genoa over the weekend, and upon the signing of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Good Neighbourly and Friendly Co-operation in Moscow a week ago (aptly described as a "tactical handshake" between a dragon and a bear in a Post editorial), were reassuringly innocuous. Many 19th-century statesmen, from Prince Metternich to Prince Bismarck, might have made similar pronouncements about the balance of power ("multi-polarity" in current lingo) or about the need to be firm with secessionists. It appeared that Russia's President, despite his KGB past, is no longer moved by the spirit of Marxism-Leninism.

What exactly is the spirit that moves Mr. Putin these days? There's reason to believe that it's Gorchakovism.  Prince Alexander Gorchakov's name hadn't been mentioned too often in the 20th century, in Russia or elsewhere, until about 10 years ago. Yet he was a pivotal figure in Russian diplomacy in the days of Czars Alexander I,

Nicholas I and Alexander II. As Russia's foreign minister for 25 years, he's credited with rehabilitating his country's standing in the world in the wake of the disastrous Crimean War of 1853-1856. After Sevastopol fell to British and French expeditionary forces in 1855, Russia's stock as a world power sank almost as low as it did following the collapse of the Berlin Wall 135 years later. It took Prince Gorchakov 15 years of cool, unhurried diplomacy to rebuild it. Working under his master, Alexander II -- the "reformist" czar who emancipated Russia's serfs -- Gorchakov took his country from the Peace of Paris, which closed the Black Sea to Russia's warships, to the 1871 Convention of London, which compensated Russia for its losses in the Crimean War.

This remarkable achievement was brought about by a realistic alignment of power relationships, culminating in clever Russian treaties with Germany and Persia. For his patient pursuit of realpolitik, Gorchakov has been compared with Bismarck (or with Henry Kissinger). Be that as it may, he became Mr. Putin's hero, as well as ex-prime minister Yevgeny Primakov's.

A laudatory piece by Mr. Primakov on Gorchakov appeared in a 1998 issue of the Russian journal International Affairs. Years earlier, when Mr. Primakov was still foreign minister, Itogi magazine's Alexander Golts asked him how the Kremlin's struggles of the moment affected Russia's foreign policy (just then Boris Yeltsin was fighting one of his periodic battles for his political survival). As Mr. Golts reported it, Mr. Primakov replied:

"Russia pursues its foreign policy not according to some considerations of the current moment, but on the basis of its historic role."

If this sounds familiar, there's a reason. Taking a long view and casting a deliberately cold eye on the alliances of the day was one of the hallmarks of 19th-century statecraft. It was Lord Palmerston, foreign secretary of Britain, who remarked about 150 years earlier: "England has no eternal friends, no eternal enemies, only eternal interests."

History appears to alternate between epochs of cold pragmatism and "hot," highly charged, ideological periods. The 20th century was deeply ideological. Russia's view is that the 21st century will resemble the 19th century rather than the 20th. Ideological divisions will count for less than realpolitik, spheres of influence and balance of power.  Europe, specifically, may revert to a model even more distant in time. It  may depart from Westphalian ideals -- i.e., the ideal of the sovereign nation-state that emerged from the Peace of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years War in 1648 -- and reconstruct itself along the medieval lines of Charlemagne's Holy Roman Empire.

The Russians aren't alone in this view. Territorially, the European Union does resemble the 9th-century dominion of Charles the Great, incorporating as it does France, Germany and the Netherlands. More importantly, Brussels' budding pan-European empire recalls Charlemagne's universe in the ruling eurocracy's imperious and supranational spirit. As Lee A. Casey and David B. Rivkin Jr. point out in a recent issue of Policy Review, "many of the European Project's supporters today look to the Europe united under Charlemagne for precedent and inspiration. Indeed, every year a Karls Preis or Charlemagne Prize is awarded to an individual to recognize the "most meritorious contribution serving European unification and the European community, serving humanity and world peace."  (Ironically, the 1999 winner was British Prime Minister Tony Blair.)

The Russian view is more oblique. Many Russians consider the EU a mere mask for Germany. Leonyd Slutskiy, deputy head of Russia's international affairs committee, writing in the influential Nezavisimaya Gazeta last year, described the "spectre" of a coming U.S.-German conflict for world domination being already "visible on the ruins of the Berlin Wall." Mr. Slutskiy posited that Americans haven't yet recognized this "hidden but unavoidable" conflict between the United States and the emerging Europe. As soon as they do, they'll realize that restoring balance by facilitating Russia's resumption of its role as a major power in a multi-polar world is in the United States' own interest.  It would, presumably, also suit Mr. Slutskiy if the Germans were to realize that Russia should be restored as a world power. A Moscow-Berlin axis would balance just as well in Prince Gorchakov's scales. What Gorchakovism opposes is "unipolarity," which today means the United States as the world's only superpower -- especially the United States under a defensive missile umbrella.

A revival of communism, or any messianic ideology, isn't on the Kremlin's current agenda. Domestic reform is quite in tune with the Gorchakovian tradition, as long as it's combined with building a Russia-China-India axis in Eurasia, and persuading the West -- even the United States, if possible-- that its true interest lies in encouraging the development of a multi-polar world in which Russia takes her rightful place. This lies at the centre of Mr. Putin's diplomacy. Though he makes few historical allusions himself, in April this year his Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, conferred the A. M. Gorchakov Commemorative Medal on Mr. Primakov.

Formidable a role model as Prince Gorchakov was, he made one mistake in 1867. That year, together with the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, the emperor's brother, he orchestrated the sale of Alaska to the United States for US$7.2-million. This was a vast sum for a chunk of inaccessible wasteland, and the Prince as well as the Grand Duke permitted themselves a little sarcasm when they remarked that Alaska's loss "would not be too painful." Today, especially when looking at potential sites of the In-Flight Interceptor Communications System of the United States' national missile defence, Messrs. Putin and Primakov would have to conclude that their hero was painfully wrong.

copyright, The National Post, 2001, All Rights Reserved

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